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1 Introduction.
The rencent global crisis has revived the interest for fiscal policy and it role as a tool
of economic boost (e.g. Blanchard and Leigh (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2014) and
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)). In a time financial distress, the debate among
advocates of fiscal austerity and fiscal stimulus has been quite prolific, generating a vast
amount of academic prodcution. We refer the reader to Ramey (2011) for a recent survey
of the literature.
Theoretical models have shown that monetary policy can hinder in the transmission
of fiscal policy and ultimately offset its effects. Indeed, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.
(2015), Eggertsson (2011) Woodford (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011) agree on the
fact that fiscal multipliers are higher when interest rates are constrained by the zero
lower bound. On the same line, Hall (2009) shows that in a liquidity trap, multipliers
can be larger if employment is responsive to demand. This conjecture, however, has not
gone unchallenged. As an example, Ramey and Zubairy (2014) fail to find significant
evidence of multipliers above average during the Great Recession. This gives a taste of
how the debate is still fervent and far from being settled.
Other theoretical conditions that can amplify the effectiveness of government actions
are summarized by Canova and Pappa (2011): high pricing frictions, strongly coun-
tercyclical markups and fiscal speding coming with provisions of future spending cuts.
Similarly, Corsetti et al. (2010) support the notion that short term stimulus policies are
most effective when coupled with medium term spending reversals.
On an empirical ground, scholars have been much concerned about estimating the
size of fiscal multiplier . However, this is no easy task. The main challenges come come
from the endogeneity of government spending and the formation of expectations about
future tax policies (Leeper et al. (2013)). To circumvent these problem, some studies
has resorted to structural VARs (Mertens and Ravn (2014), Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)), also in time varying frameworks (Kirchner et al. (2010);
Pereira and Silva Lopes (2014)). Other empirical strategies rely on instrumenting fiscal
spending with military expenditure (inter alia, Barro and Redlick (2009)).
Furthermore, the crisis has shown how interconnected the world is and how quickly
downturns in a country can spread their contagion internationally. Not withstanding
this, little work is done on the cross-country effects of fiscal policy. Our work addressed
this gap in the literature and it is aimed at shading some light on spillovers effects in
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the euro area.
This is especially interesting taken into consideration that EU monetary policy is
common, markets are highly integrated, countries are institutionally bond but fiscal
policy is not quite unified. Since the outbreak of the crisis, the idea of increasing fiscal
coordination beyond the European Stability Mechanism has been a near-constant subject
of political discussion. This is why it is important to testify the existence and quantify
the amount of fiscal spillovers, in order to provide policymakers with robust evidence to
drive the process of European integration.
However, as it is the case of fiscal multipliers, the current literature on fiscal spillover
has not quite reached a consensus. Gros and Hobza (2001) do a review of result from
different macro models and report how cross-country spillovers are are indeed uncertain,
both in sign and magnitude. For instance, Cwik and Wieland (2011) present five DSGE
new Keyenesian models calibrated to the euro area, finding that spillovers between coun-
tries are negligible or even negative.
There are though theoretical reasons lending support to the existence of fiscal spillover.
Policy shocks can propagate via the demand channel, when domestic demand affects for-
eign demand too. This can happen due to inflationary pressure in a country shifting
trade balances across EU states. Also, spillovers can act through financial markets,
when the excessive borrowing in the source country increases the risk premium of for-
eign economies. Even if there is no explicit bail out rule, markets might expect members
states to be somehow liable for their neighbors sovereign debt, thus associating higher
risk premium to higher risk of financial of contagion.
Our work thus contributes to the ongoing discussion, presenting empirical evidence
of the cross border effects of fiscal policy across four countries in the Euro zone, namely
Italy, France, Germany and Spain. Using a Time-Varying Coefficients VAR model we
find that economic cycles are correlated, underlining the interdependence across member
states. Furthermore, even in absence of explicit fiscal coordination, we find that shifts
in government spending cause international spillovers, with heterogeneous signs and
magnitudes across countries.
We include time variation in the analysis, given that Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) suggest that spillovers vary across the business cycle, showing stronger effects
in recessions. On the contrary, Faccini et al. (2016) find limited state dependence in
the international transmission of fiscal policy. However, our sample spanning from 1995
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to 2014, includes institutional as well a financial beaks and naturally calls for a time
varying setting. Indeed, we found that spillovers are especially sizable in the medium
run and during the financial crisis. Our empirical approach relies on estimating the
effects of shocks in one source country on all the other country’s output. This has the
the twofold advantage of providing with a transparent and straightforward interpretation
while allowing for heterogeneity in the transmission across member states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow, section 2 presents the model,
the, the identification strategy and the estimation approach, of time-varying impulse
responses and second moments. Then, section 3 reports the empirical evidence on cross-
border spillovers across the countries at hand. Finally, section 4 summarizes and con-
cludes.
2 Econometric Approach.
2.1 The Model.
We perform the analysis using a structural time-varying VAR model with stochastic
volatility (see Primiceri (2005)). With the model we compute time-varying second mo-
ments to measure fiscal policy coordination and identify a government spending shock
using zero restrictions. Let yt be a n- dimensional vector of macroeconomic variables.
We assume that
yt = A0,t +A1,tyt−1 + ...+Ap,tyt−p + εt (1)
where εt is a n× 1 Gaussian white noise vector with time-varying covariance matrix Σt,
A0,t is a n×1 vector of time-varying coefficients and Ai,t are n×n matrices of time-varying
coefficients, i = 1, ..., p. Let us define At = [A1,t, A2,t..., Ap,t], and θt = vec([A0,t At]
′),
where vec(·) is the stacking column operator. We assume that the VAR coefficients
evolve as
θt = θt−1 + ωt (2)
where ωt is a Gaussian white noise vector with covariance Ω.
Let us now consider the following decomposition of the innovation covariance: Σt =
FtDtF
′
t , where Ft is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and Dt
a diagonal matrix. Let σt be a column vector containing the diagonal elements of D
1/2
t
and let φi,t, i = 1, ..., 4, be a column vector containing the first i elements of the (i+1)-th
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row of F−1t . In addition we assume that the states evolve according to
log σt = log σt−1 + ξt (3)
φi,t = φi,t−1 + ψi,t (4)
where ξt and ψi,t are Gaussian white noise vectors with zero mean and variance Ξ and
Ψi respectively. Let φt = [φ
′
1,t, . . . , φ
′
n−1,t], ψt = [ψ′1,t, . . . , ψ′n−1,t] and let Ψ be the
covariance matrix of ψt. We assume that ψi,t and ψj,t are uncorrelated for j 6= i and
that ξt, ψt, ωt, εt are mutually uncorrelated.
2.2 Time-varying second moments.
The time-varying second moments of yt, in particular correlations, can be studied using
the “approximate” MA representation
yt = µt + Ct(L)εt−k (5)
where Ct(L) =
∑∞
k=0Ck,tL
k, C0,t = I, Ck,t = Sn,n(Akt ), At =
(
At
In(p−1) 0n(p−1),n
)
,
At = [A1t...Apt], and Sn,n(X) is a function selecting the first n rows and n columns of
the matrix X. The time-varying covariance matrix of yit is given by
Vt =
∞∑
k=0
Ck,tΣtC
′
k,t.
The time-varying correlation between variable j and i is simply given by
ρi,jt =
Vt,ji√
Vt,jjVt,ii
(6)
where Vt,ji denotes the element j, i of Vt.
2.3 Identification.
One of the main focus of the paper is the investigation of the existence of fiscal policy
spillovers across the four countries. Let yt = [gjt git xjt xit]
′ where gjt and git is govern-
ment spending in country j and i and xjt and xit are GDP growth in country j and i. We
consider six different models with all possible combinations of countries. A government
spending shock in country i is identified following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The
shock is the only shock orthogonal to government spending in country j which has a
non-zero contemporaneous effect on government spending in country i. Orthogonality
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to foreign spending is important to “control” for fiscal policy in other countries. Iden-
tification is implemented as follows. Let St be the Cholesky factor of Σt (StS
′
t = Σt).
Postmultiply the reduced form impulse response functions Bt(L) = Ct(L)St. The gov-
ernment spending shock so that the second column of Bt(L) represents the effects of the
government spending. The shock is the second shock in the vector et = S
−1
t εt.
2.4 Specification and estimation.
Estimation is standard and is done along the lines of Gal´ı and Gambetti (2015)1 . Below
we discuss some aspects of the prior densities calibration. We use one lag. As it is
standard in the literature, we assume that Ω, Ξ Ψ θ0, φ0 and log σ0, are all independent.
Let W (S, d) denote a Wishart distribution with scale matrix S and degrees of freedom
d, we assume:
θ0 ∼ N(θˆ, Vˆθ)
log σ0 ∼ N(log σˆ0, In)
φi0 ∼ N(φˆi, Vˆφi)
Ω−1 ∼ W (Ω−1, ρ
1
)
Ξ−1 ∼ W (Ξ−1, ρ
2
)
Ψ−1i ∼ W (Ψ−1i , ρ3i)
Scale matrices are parametrized as follows: Ω = ρ
1
(λ1Vˆθ), Ξ = ρ2(λ2In) and Ψi =
ρ
3i
(λ3Vˆφi). The degrees of freedom ρ1 and ρ2 are equal to the number of rows Ω
−1 and In
plus one respectively and ρ
3i
is i+1 for i = 1, ..., n−1. The parameters φˆi, Vˆφi , log σˆ0, θˆ, Vˆθ
are imposed equal to the OLS estimates of obtained from a time invariant VAR estimated
for the full sample. Finally we assume λ1 = 0.0005, λ2 = 0.01 and λ3 = 0.01. The choice
of the λ’s is relatively conservative especially for λ1 and is motivated by the fact that
we want time variations not to be inflated by our priors. The posterior distribution of
the parameters is obtained with the Gibbs sampler. See the online appendix of Gal´ı and
Gambetti (2015) for the details of the of the seven steps involved in the algorithm.
1For details about the estimation we refer the reader to the online appendix of of Gal´ı and Gambetti
(2015).
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3 Evidence.
Here we present and discuss the main results of the paper, divided in two main groups.
First, we discuss evidence about fiscal policy and coordination and business cycle syn-
chronization. Second we present results about fiscal policy spillovers.
3.1 Cycles and Fiscal policy coordination.
To study fiscal policy coordination we use model (1) where yt is a vector including the
series of real government spending for the four countries. We estimate the model and
compute the time varying correlations (6). The use of time varying techniques allows
to investigate the evolution of the model parameters, which is especially interesting in
a sample featuring financial distress and regime switching. Thus we assess the time
evolution of real GDP and governments spending growth, both in terms of cross-country
correlations and of variances. We find evidence of strong correlation of the business
cycles. Conversely, we observe no cross-country synchronization in fiscal spending. Also,
we find heterogeneity in terms of variance, with similar patterns in France and Germany
but distinctive behaviors in Spain and Italy.
Figure 1 reports the time varying correlations for the GDP growth of the four coun-
tries. The solid lines depicts the median draw from the posterior distribution while the
grey areas represent the 68% confidence bands. As emerges from the picture, cross-
country correlations in GDP growth is high and roughly stable throughout the sample
period. This implies that business cycle fluctuations are very much synchronized across
countries.
Also, notice how correlations increase during the global financial crisis, peaking
around 2009. This mirrors how the economic slowdown hit all the countries pervasively,
provoking parallel recessions. Only Spain and Italy maintained a stable time varying
correlation, showing that their GPD performance has similar faith both in good and in
bad times. Indeed, especially in the cross comparison with France and Germany, we
observe similar pattern of convergence during the recession period followed by a drastic
reduction in correlations after 2010. This latter drop might be explained by a different
pace of recovery between the peripheral and core countries of the sample.
Figure 2 plots the time varying variance of GDP growth. The series differ in magni-
tude, with higher values in Italy and Germany. However, they follow identical dynamics.
On the one hand, we observe a first spike around 1999, which coincides with the intro-
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duction of the monetary union and the common currency. This advocates in favor of
our choice of a time varying model, that spots and controls for regime switches. On
the other hand, the maximal peak is to be found a decade later in correspondence of
the global recession. The financial turmoil spread uncertainty across borders, provoking
a steep increase in the variance of GDP growth. Such trend is reverted at the end of
the sample, where the progressive economic recovery shrunk the variances back to their
pre-crisis levels.
If on the one hand, output growth is highly synchronized across countries (also in
terms of uncertainty), on the other hand we do not observe any co-movements in fiscal
policy. Figure 3 displays the time-varying correlations of government spending across
member states. Clearly, correlations are largely non significant, mirroring the absence of
coordinated fiscal spending across states. The only exception the Italian-Spanish case,
whose estimates are positive, even if very low. Once more we find higher affinity within
the peripheral states and larger heterogeneity with the core countries.
Notice for instance the case of France, whose point estimates suggest opposite reac-
tions to spending in other countries. Especially when coupled with Germany, we observe
persistently negative correlations, significant at least in the initial part of the sample. If
anything, it seems that there is a counter reaction rather than a coordination of spending
among the two countries. This suggest that French aversion for German fiscal manage-
ment may date older that the 2012 elections, in which the winning party vowed to break
the austerity measures sweeping Europe. In fact, we do not observe much discontinuity
in the correlations before and after the Socialist party came in office.
Notwithstanding the lack of coordination, France and Germany show quite similar
features regarding second moments. Figure 4 plots the time-varying variance of govern-
ment spending growth. We can see that both France and Germany present a decreasing
trend, with confidence bands shrinking towards the recent part of the sample. This drop
in variance could be attributable to a reduction of the the discretionary part of fiscal
policy, which translates into a limit to governments’ actions and to smaller swings in
spending. Also, the time-varying variance has spikes in 1999 and in 2009, suggesting
that regime changes and periods of economical distress take their tall on fiscal spending
too.
Moreover, Italy and Spain display a completely sui generis behavior in terms of vari-
ance. Italy presents relatively constant estimates, inflating in 2000-2004 but stabilizing
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at a roughly fixed value. Spain on his side, shows an overall upwards trend, especially
from 2011 when the popular party come to power. If is not coincidental, the recent
increase in volatility can be read as the government need to resort to larger spending
swings to achieve its program of cutting deficit, recapitalizing banks and promoting labor
market reforms.
3.2 Fiscal spillovers in EU countries.
We identify a government spending shock in each country via timing restrictions. On
impact, a policy shock in country i is constrained to be orthogonal to spending in country
j. In this fashion, structural disturbances are cleaned out of contemporaneous policy co-
movements and represent purely non-coordinated domestic shocks. Notice that we do
not impose restriction on output growth. In fact, a policy shift can redirect consumers
towards national or foreign produced goods, with consequent adjustment of the trade
balance, and direct effect on output growth.
The mechanism of transmission is posited in business-cycle models, as in Chari et al.
(2002) and Corsetti et al. (2010) among others, even if the magnitude and sign of
spillovers greatly depend on calibration and the debate on overall policy effect is far
from being settled. In a nut shell, an exogenous increase of government spending can
affect other countries via the trade channel. In fact, a fiscal stimulus can ease market
frictions and benefit foreign output via increased demand for imports. However, there
are also forces counteracting positive spillovers effects. Higher demand puts pressure on
output gap and inflation. This translates into an increase in the long rate, which in turns
dampens consumption. Such effect is amplified especially when spending is debt-financed
and the country has already an high burden of public debt.
Furthermore, Corsetti et al. (2010) show that spillovers effect depend on whether
fiscal policy is financed only with taxes or it is coupled with a credible medium-term
consolidation plan. Their results point out that coordinated spending reversal reduce
fluctuations in the long rates, thus easing the trade off between demand for output and
crowding out of consumption and investment.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by presenting empirical insights
on international spillovers effects in a sample of European countries. Given the mixed
evidence inherited from theory, it comes as no surprise that we obtain heterogeneous
results, both in term of signs and magnitudes.
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A summary of the estimated spillover effects is presented in Table 1. It reports the
average of cumulative percentage effect on GDP re-scaled by the average of cumulative
percentage effect on government spending of the country where the shock takes place.
In simple words, we compute, over 4 and 12 horizons, how much variation in GDP
relative to spending is implied by an exogenous fiscal shock. Therefore these ratios can
be interpreted as mean spillover effects across countries.
A first result is that, with few exception, spillovers are larger in the medium run.
That is, wide swings in domestic spending are associated to moderate reactions of foreign
output within the first year. Conversely, when we expand the analysis to 12 quarters,
we observe spillover ratios that are as high as twice their short run value. We can read
this result in light of the lack of coordination of fiscal policy. Without synchronization,
there is few simultaneous contagious between neighbor countries and spillovers take the
form of delayed demand and trade adjustments.
Once we have established that spillovers peak in the medium run, it is interesting to
assess which historical moment features the stronger cross-country contagion. Table 2
contains the results of this exercise, reporting the dates of maximal spillovers, measured
in terms of effects on GDP within the first three years after the shock. The interesting
results is that higher spillovers are concentrated in the 2008-2010 period. This points
to the fact that global distress amplifies cross-border effects, making countries more
sensitive to their partners domestic policies. Therefore, especially in harsh times, there
might be space for fruitful fiscal coordination, which is not observed in the data so far.
Next, to detail the consequences of spillovers of each country, Figure 6 to Figure 9
present a battery of time varying impulse responses. The panels gather the effects of a
spending shock in a specific country after zero, four and eight quarters. Each subplot
displays the time evolution of such effects. Put it differently, for each t in the sample
range, we plot the (median posterior) impulse response at a fixed horizon k. The shaded
area represent conventional 68% confidence bands. Broadly speaking, we observe that
domestic effects of government spending are positive, even if non significant for France
and Spain - questioning the overall effectiveness of their fiscal strategy. As regards
spillovers, we have heterogeneous results, both in terms of significance and magnitude.
Therefore, we review each case individually.
Starting with Figure 6, we observe how a spending shock in France has positive
and significant effects of the GDP of Germany and Spain (while it falls short in affect-
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ing Italy). This result stands out, being France the only observation whose spending
is negatively correlated with the remaining countries. In a sense France in the least
“coordinated” and at the same time it is the one with stronger cross-border spillovers.
Observe, for instance the positive effects on Spanish GDP, which - as discussed above -
have higher and more significant effects in the medium run. Furthermore the median es-
timates peak in 2008, confirming the interwoven fate of France and its southern neighbor
in the crisis periods. As regards the French-German spillovers, we observe an interesting
change in timing. Up to 2004, there was virtually no effect on impact, while in the
medium run we had stable and significant estimates. From 2004 the situation is reversed
with sizable effects happening only contemporaneously.
Figure 7 reports results for Germany. Clearly, fiscal shocks have positive effects
domestically for all the displayed horizons. However, starting from the financial crisis,
an increased variance of the estimates made it harder to read these results. Similar
conclusions apply to spillovers on Italy, which are positive and stable, but non strongly
significant after 2006. What is more surprising is the null effects over France, which
brings forward the empirical fact that spillovers are non necessarily symmetrical across
borders. Somehow less surprising is the lack of German-Spanish effects. Indeed, we saw
that Spain and Germany are the two countries with weakest correlations both in terms
of cycles and in terms of spending, and it comes as no surprise that spillovers only have
a limited scope.
As regards Spain, responses are displayed in Figure 8. The majority of the interna-
tional effects of Spanish spending are non significant on other countries, with exception
of Germany. Curiously, an expansionary policy shock has persistently negative effects
on German output. This singularity in the data might be the reflection of a consump-
tion crowding out which more than compensates the positive demand spilled over. Once
more, we observe asymmetric effects across countries.
Finally, Italy is reported in Figure 9, and has small but generally non-zero effects
on the other countries. The difference is that spillovers on France and Germany are
mostly significant at intermediate horizons, while the bulk of the transmission with
Spain happens on impact, especially from the financial crisis onward. Furthermore, Italy
displays positive domestic response to fiscal spending, peaking during the crisis period.
This replicates closely the behavior observed in Germany, and shade some optimistic
light on the positive scope of fiscal policy as a mean of economic stimulus.
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4 Conclusions.
In this paper we present empirical evidence on fiscal spillovers for a set of European
countries - namely France, Spain, Germany and Italy - over the last two decades.
To attack the issue we setup a time varying VAR for GPD and government spending
growth. This has a twofold advantage. On the one hand it is especially fit in periods
with regime switching and global instability. On the other hand, it allows to explore
the time change of the parameters and better understand the evolution of structural
dynamics among the countries.
Identification is reached via Cholesky restrictions. More in detail, we impose that
a fiscal shock in one country is uncorrelated on impact with foreign spending. This is
enough to ensure that we are extracting purely domestic fiscal disturbances. Also, we
leave the response of GDP growth unrestricted, since they channel spillovers via the
trading balance.
The main results of the empirical analysis are grouped in two blocks. First, we present
time varying correlations and variances of both the GDP and the spending growth rates.
Then, we explore the role of fiscal spillovers, using impulse responses from the identified
shocks.
A first result in the data is that the four countries have very much synchronized
business cycles, whose variance peaks in moments of regime switch (introduction of the
euro) or of economic distress (global financial crisis). Conversely, we observe a complete
lack of fiscal coordination, both in terms of co-movements and of second moments. Only
Spain and Italy display some positive, but very small, spending correlation.
As regards spillovers, we exploit the impulse responses to compute multipliers as
the ratio of (cumulative) variation in GDP relative to spending. We find that spillovers
have higher strength in the medium run, reaching up to twice the impact effects after 12
quarters. Also, we show that spillovers are maximal during the crisis period. This paves
the way of the debate on gains of fiscal coordination, especially in averse times, which
we leave for future research.
Finally, we present evidence of heterogeneous responses to fiscal shocks across coun-
tries. We observe mixed evidence in term of sign, magnitudes and significance, with
France and Italy affecting nearly all the others countries and Spain displaying even neg-
ative effects on Germany. This leads us to the conclusion that with uncoordinated fiscal
spending spillovers do not act symmetrically and are not always significant nor benign.
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This work want to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the role and benefits of
fiscal stimulus, especially in periods of global turmoil. It might be interesting to expand
the analysis to include a wider range of macroeconomic indicators, for instance interest
rates or consumption growth. This might help disentangling details of the transmission
mechanism, such as crowding out of consumption or inflationary pressure. This, and
other correlated issues are left to future research.
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Tables.
Shock France Shock Germany Shock Spain Shock Italy
1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years
France −− −− 0.0369 0.0606 0.0100 0.0266 0.1168 0.1684
Germany 0.3117 0.3941 −− −− -0.1825 -0.1901 0.0995 0.1888
Spain 0.3203 0.6466 -0.0080 -0.0374 −− −− 0.0884 0.1507
Italy -0.0172 0.1332 0.1975 0.2313 -0.0028 0.0529 −− −−
Table 1: Spillover effects. The numbers represent the average (over draws and over time)
cumulated percentage effect on GDP in the four countries in the first 4 quarters and 12
quarters, rescaled by the average (over draws and over time) cumulated percentage effect
on the government spending variable of the country where the shock takes place.
Shock France Shock Germany Shock Spain Shock Italy
France −− 2001:Q2 1996:Q2 2008:Q3
Germany 2009:Q2 −− 2011:Q4 2008:Q3
Spain 2008:Q3 2000:Q2 −− 2009:Q3
Italy 2008:Q2 2008:Q4 2011:Q4 −−
Table 2: Dates of maximal spillover effects considering the effects on GDP within the first
three years after the shock. The cumulated effects of GDP are divided by the cumulated
effects on the government spending variable of the country where the effects take place.
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Figures.
Figure 1: time-varying correlations of GDP growth across countries. Solid line posterior
median, grey area 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 2: time-varying variance GDP. Solid line posterior median, grey area 68% confi-
dence bands.
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Figure 3: time-varying correlations of government spending growth across countries.
Solid line posterior median, grey area 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 4: time-varying variance government spending. Solid line posterior median, grey
area 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 5: time-varying standard deviation of the government spending shock. The stan-
dard deviation is estimated by normalizing the effect of the shock on government spend-
ing of the home country equal to one. Solid line posterior median, grey area 68% confi-
dence bands.
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Figure 6: impulse response functions to a government spending shock in France.
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Figure 7: impulse response functions to a government spending shock in Germany.
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Figure 8: impulse response functions to a government spending shock in Spain.
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Figure 9: impulse response functions to a government spending shock in Italy.
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